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United States Occupation Court in Berlin. For the first time in several
decades the United States is asserting its right as an occupying power to
convene a court in Berlin. Known formally as United States Element Allied
Kommandatura v. Ruske and Tiede, the case involves two East Germans
accused of hijacking a Polish airliner and forcing it to land in West Berlin.
United States rights in Berlin date from the arrival of Allied Forces in
Germany in 1943. General Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander,
issued a proclamation suspending German courts and replacing them with
military government tribunals (MGT) established "for the trial of offenses
against the interests of the Allied Forces."' These MGTs eventually heard
hundreds of thousands of cases, encompassing not just occupation-related
crimes such as illegal border crossings and curfew violations but ordinary
crimes as well. At one point, some 343 MGTs operated in the United States
Zone of occupation. But their number began to decline sharply in January
1946, when concurrent jurisdiction was granted to newly opened German
courts, and they disappeared altogether in the early 1950s with the agree-
ments terminating the Allied occupation of Germany. However, the Allied
*Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
'See Nobleman, Military Government Courts: Law and Justice in the American Zone of
Germany, 33 A.B.A.J. 777, 779 (1947). See generally Clark & Goodman, American Justice in
Occupied Germany: United States Military Government Courts, 36 A.B.A.J. 443 (1950);
Loewenstein, Reconstruction of the Administration of Justice in American-Occupied Ger-
many, 61 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1948); and McCauley, American Courts in Germany: 600,000
Cases Later, 40 A.B.A.J. 1041 (1954).
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Powers never yielded occupation rights to Berlin. To this day, that city is
governed, at least technically, by a Kommandatura consisting of France,
the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia,' each of whom adminis-
ters a sector of the city and retains the right to establish its own courts in its
sector. In practice, this right has seldom been asserted.'
Then why has the United States decided to convene a court at this time?
According to reports appearing in the press, the United States Government
decided to step in after the West German government declined to prosecute
the accused hijackers for political reasons.' Its action probably relates to the
fact that the United States is a party to the 1970 Hague International Hi-
jacking Convention.' Article 4(2) of the Convention obligates every con-
tracting state to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offence . . . where the alleged offender is present in its
territory and it does not extradite him" to the airline's state. Article 7 says
that the contracting state "in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found" is obliged, "without exception whatsoever and whether or not the
offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for . . . prosecution." The State Department is not discouraging
speculation that this is why the United States Government has decided to
establish a tribunal in Berlin to hear the instant case, although for the
record it will say only that the Government's rights and responsibilities as
an occupying power are affected.
There being no United States occupation court in Berlin, the United
States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany appoints the offi-
cers of the court under occupation legislation still in effect. Ambassador
Walter S. Stoessel, Jr., has appointed Herbert Stern, a United States district
court judge from New Jersey, to preside; Roger Adleman, an Assistant
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to prosecute (but as
"Special Assistant United States Attorney for Berlin," not as an Assistant
United States Attorney as such); and Judah Best of Washington, D.C., and
Bernard Hellring of Newark, New Jersey, as defense counsel. In March,
1979 Judge Stern ruled that defendants are protected by United States
constitutional guarantees. The case brings to mind two earlier
cases: Madsen v. Kinsella,6 which traced the development of occupation
'The Soviet Union purported to withdraw from the Kommandatura in 1948, but the other
occupying powers continue to regard it as a party to and bound by the obligations it undertook
as an occupying power. Thus, for example, they refuse to recognize East Berlin as the capital
of the German Democratic Republic and treat it, instead, as the Soviet sector in Berlin.
'The British Government reportedly asserted its rights some years ago when a West Berliner
shot at a Soviet citizen in the British sector. The French Government asserted its rights as
recently as 1969, in connection with a hijacking into the French sector.
'U.S. Tries Case in Berlin, Under 1945 Pact, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 3.
'Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), done Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (entered into force for the United States Oct. 14,
1971).
'343 U.S. 341 (1952).
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courts in detail; and Reid v. Covert,' in which Justice Hugo Black ex-
pounded on the Constitution's hold on United States courts wherever they
sit. Important aspects of the pleadings and rulings in the case may be
published, unofficially, in International Legal Materials and could also
appear in the Digest of United States Practice in International Law pre-
pared quarterly by the State Department for the American Journal of In-
ternational Law and published annually, in more complete form, by the
United States Government Printing Office under the same title.
Extraterritoriality and international law. Until fairly recently, American
courts confronted with challenges to the extraterritorial reach of American
laws tended to look to constitutional or other national policy considerations
for guidance. Typically, the larger issue would be reduced to one of jurisdic-
tion over the persons or res involved in the suit, in which case the court
could look to International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 which holds that the
existence of at least "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
forum is an essential ingredient of in personam jurisdiction under the
Constitution's due process clause. When the Supreme Court in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 9 extended that requirement to quasi in rem jurisdiction by demand-
ing some nexus between property which is the basis of jurisdiction and the
cause of action itself,'" it became even easier for a judge troubled by the
length of our national legal arms to extrapolate limiting principles from our
national legal principles. Even the notion of forum non conveniens could
be, and usually has been, invoked in the name of national, not interna-
tional, policy considerations.''
The problem is that, viewed from a larger perspective, what is involved is
intrinsically a problem of global allocation of competence. That is, from the
global perspective of international law, the fulfillment of American consti-
tutional or other policy requirements is far from the last word-or even the
most relevant one.
This clash of perspectives was underscored last year by harsh criticism in
the United Kingdom's House of Lords directed at the excessive zeal with
which American antitrust laws are sometimes enforced extraterritorially.
The case was Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,' and
no less a figure than Lord Wilberforce quoted with approval from the
intervention by the Attorney General in behalf of H.M. Government to the
effect that "the wide investigatory procedures under the United States anti-
trust legislation against persons outside the United States who are not
United States citizens constitute an infringement of the proper jurisdiction
'354 U.S. 1 (1957).
-326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'433 U.S. 186 (1977).
"The precise scope of Shaffer is still being developed in rec~nt cases. See, e.g., Marketing
Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 457 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and Amoco
Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 459 F. Supp. 1242
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"See Dorati v. Dorati, 342 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"11978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977) E.
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and sovereignty of the United Kingdom."I 3 Viscount Dilhorne agreed, add-
ing that "[the] exercise [of] jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts
done outside [U.S.] jurisdiction . . . is not in accordance with international
law.,"I
Lords is hardly a hotbed of anti-Americanism, nor is it invariably
xenophobic.' 5 So one cannot easily dismiss its concern on either of these
accounts. The fact is that their Lordships are justified in drawing attention
to the overlapping of national laws and the attendant need to develop
international principles of accommodation allocating among the world's
now numerous national legal systems' competence to deal with conduct
with which more than one of them has a legitimate interest. Traditional
principles of international law offer a starting point, but little more than
that owing to their ambiguity, inconsistency and relative isolation from
other policy considerations.
They tend to fall into three categories. The first category is sometimes
called the nationality principle and says, in effect, that nationality carries
with it an attachment to one's national legal system. From the standpoint of
our constitutional notions of due process, the nationality principle is not
without flaws. But empirically national governments seldom challenge one
another's competence to deal with the conduct of its own citizens wherever
that conduct occurs.
As to the conduct of aliens, several variants of what is loosely called the
territoriality principle are usually invoked. One, the so-called subjective
territorial principle (the "conduct" test), bases jurisdiction on conduct oc-
curring within a nation's territorial limits. The situs of the effects flowing
from the conduct is largely irrelevant to the inquiry. On the other hand, the
so-called objective territorial principle (the "effects" test) accords jurisdic-
tion over acts which cause foreseeable and substantial effects within the
country, regardless of where those acts occurred. It is the objective territo-
rial principle, when applied to the conduct of nonresident aliens, which
usually evokes cries of national overreaching, as illustrated by the Rio Tinto
case.
But the objective principle itself abounds in normative ambiguity. Under
what has been labelled the protective principle, for example, a nation is
justified in punishing conduct committed abroad which has serious conse-
'Id. at 434. Lord Wilberforce directed attention specifically to article 12(b) of the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. 7444, which expressly provides that in deciding whether to give effect to letters
rogatory-in this instance those issued out of a United States district court in Virginia-courts
are entitled to have regard to any possible prejudice to the sovereignty of their state. But his
observation has precedent in longheld attitudes of British courts toward the extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust laws. E.g., British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780, [1953] ch. 19.
"Id. at 460.
"E.g., C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego Rolimpex [19781 3 W.L.R.
274, summarized unofficially in HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND MONTHLY REV., July 1978, at
p. 12.
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quences for its national security or the integrity of its public order system
(e.g., counterfeiting).' 6 But not all penal laws are regarded as being of this
sort. Antitrust laws, for example, whether penal or not, are often treated as
mere commercial policy preferences unrelated to the kind of national dan-
ger the protective principle is concerned with. The line between national
imperative and parochial overenthusiasm cannot yet be said to have been
drawn with precision.
In any event, unless the International Court of Justice unexpectedly finds
itself charged with drawing an international jurisdictional road map, there
is scant prospect for an authoritative demarcation in the immediate future.
That suits the common law tradition just fine. At the same time it under-
scores the increasingly important role national courts of law and equity are
playing in developing a comprehensive world legal order. Whether they
acknowledge it or not, national courts have come to serve a global legal
community, not just a domestic one. Two recent cases illustrate the point
and in so doing give further evidence of a trend among American courts
away from reliance on purely national policy considerations in limiting
extraterritorial assertions of national legal competence.
The first, lT v. Cornfeld,' 7 handed down last December, makes only a
passing reference to international law as such but is infused with a transna-
tional perspective. In it, Judge Gerard L. Goettel dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction a derivative suit brought under Section l0b of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 in behalf of foreign shareholders of a
foreign mutual fund. The action, in the nature of a derivative suit, had been
instituted by liquidators of one of four mutual funds that once constituted a
large part of 10S, Ltd. ("made somewhat infamous by Bernard Cornfeld
and later by Robert Vesco"). Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy, or series of
conspiracies, between the directors of lIT's management company and sev-
eral other groups of defendants to defraud IIT's shareholders. They specifi-
cally challenged three transactions: the purchase in Europe of $8 million in
debentures of a foreign subsidiary of an American company; the purchase
of some $14 million in stock of an American company, and a loan of some
$12 million to an American company.
But in his opinion Judge Goettel found the ultimate alleged deception to
be a nondomestic act and he thought it untoward for an American court to
impose a Rule lOb-5 duty to disclose on foreign directors of a foreign
"See Sahovic & Bishop, The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and
Places, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 362-65 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); and See
generally J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 299-300 (6th ed. 1963). Ironically, British ob-
servers such as Brierly often ascribe to American courts, like British ones, a skepticism about
the legitimacy of exceptions to the territorial basis of criminal jurisdiction over nonnationals.
See Brierly, supra, and J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (7th ed. 1972).
'462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"IS U.S.C. § 78.
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corporate entity for the benefit of foreign fundholders.' 9 Subject matter
jurisdiction, he decided, could not be sustained merely because .5 percent of
the fund's assets was held by Americans or because the alleged scheme as a
whole involved the purchase of American securities and some domestic acts
by alleged American aiders and abettors. All the domestic acts of the alleged
aiders and abettors became "preparatory" or secondary to the primary
deception practiced on the fundholders. "Since virtually all the fundholders
were foreign nationals residing in foreign countries, the deception, if it
could be proved, must have occurred outside the United States." 2
[T]he essential fraud here was foreign, "and the line has to be drawn somewhere
if the securities laws are not to apply in every instance where something has
happened in the United States, however large the gap between that something and
a consummated fraud and however negligible the effect in the United States or on
its citizens.'''
Too unlimited an extension of the federal securities laws, Judge Goettel
concluded, "even if possible under international law and the Constitution,
cannot be warranted." 22
A few weeks later, the federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Continental Grain (Australia) Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. 23 reversed
a district court order dismissing another securities law case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, but this time the focus of the opinion was
squarely on the international law implications of the alleged subject matter
jurisdiction. Not necessarily noteworthy as precedent because of the
uniqueness of the nondisclosure complained of (it was another lOb-5 case),
the court's opinion is certain to be cited for its lengthy discussion of the
application of international law principles by United States courts in recent
securities laws cases and its conclusion, inter alia, that this application has
been something less than a model of consistency.2" Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the court does not merely recite what it regards as relevant principles
of international law, though it does that (not altogether persuasively), it
"Supra note 17 at 223. The court noted, at 212, that only 218 of the 144, 496 fundholders
currently reside in the United States.
"Id. at 220.
111d., quoting from lIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
"1462 F. Supp. at 223.
"1592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
1"See Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1196 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1975). For example, in
Seizer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court found
satisfaction of both the effects and the conduct tests was necessary for a finding of subject
matter jurisdiction. But the Second Circuit in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975),
formulated three categories of fact situations in which the two tests were applied alternatively.
Other courts have applied only one of the tests. See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d
591 (3d Cir. 1976) (conduct test); Investment Properties International, Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 170-71 Decisions], P93,011 at 90,735 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion (2d
Cir. 1971) (unreported) (effects test). The Eighth Circuit in the instant case agreed with the
Second Circuit's opinion in Bersch v. Drexel.
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also examines the policy implications such principles reflect.25
The significance of the trend evidenced by these two and other recent
securities law cases seems to be twofold: in the first place, counsel cannot
assume that pleadings which discuss only the domestic law implications of
extraterritoriality will prove compelling; in the second, judges may find the
influence exerted by their opinions extending to the entire international
legal community-extraterritorially, so to speak.
Foreign sovereign immunity. In Upton v. Empire of Iran, 26 the District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed for lack of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction an action brought against the Empire of Iran and
Iran's Department of Civil Aviation, as owner of Mehrabad International
Airport's terminal building in Tehran, for wrongful death, survival and
personal injury following collapse of the roof of the building in 1974.
Plaintiffs, American nationals, had charged defendants with negligence and
strict liability in tort, claiming jurisdiction under a provision in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 197627 that establishes jurisdiction where an
action is based on commercial activity of a foreign state outside the territory
of the United States which causes a direct effect in the United States. 8
District Judge Charles R. Richey found absent the minimum contacts
with the jurisdiction which are required for in personam jurisdiction under
International Shoe, quasi in rem jurisdiction under Shaffer, and jurisdic-
tion over subject matter by the Act itself. "The common sense interpreta-
tion of a 'direct effect' is one which has no intervening element, but, rather,
flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption."2 9 Such injuries as
occurred, "though endured here, were caused in Tehran." 3 0
The decision cites with approval' the decision of the federal District
Court for the Southern District in Carey v. National Oil Corp.," which also
holds that the Act's "direct effect" test embodies the "minimum contacts"
requirement of International Shoe.
Immunities of intergovernmental organizations. The conceptual bases of
sovereign immunity differ from those of the immunity accorded in-
tergovernmental organizations, the latter being functional and teleological,
the former being attributable to state sovereignty and reciprocity. More-
over, while state sovereignty derives from principles of comity embedded in
"See also SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest
Industries (Manitoba), Ltd. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977) ("We are reluctant to conclude that
Congress intended to allow the United States to become a 'Barbary Coast', as it were, har-
boring international securities 'pirates'." 548 F.2d at 116).
11459 F. Supp. 264 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
2728 U.S.C. §§ 1330 et seq. (1976).
"Id. § 1605(a)(2).
"Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. at 266.
301d.
31Id.
"453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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general international law, the immunity of intergovernmental organizations
is largely a matter of treaty law, specifically, the constitutive treaties estab-
lishing the organizations.
Typical of the genre is the United Nations Charter,33 Article 104 of which
provides that the organization shall enjoy in the territory of each member
state "such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its func-
tions and the fulfillment of its purposes," and Article 105(1) of which adds
"such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes." There is little doubt that the immunity intended is absolute.
Commission IV on the Judicial Organization of the 1945 San Francisco
Conference stated the general understanding that the proposed language
indicated
in a general way all that could be considered necessary to the realization of the
purposes of the Organization, to the free functioning of its organs and to the
independent exercise of the functions and duties of their officials: exemption
from tax, immunity from jurisdiction, . . . inviolability of buildings, properties,
and archives, etc .... [N]o member state may hinder in any way the working of
the Organization or take any measures the effect of which might be to increase its
burdens, financial or other.'
So, absent any legislative history to the contrary, there is little reason to
suspect that when Congress codified the restrictive doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),13 it also
had in mind altering the existing, absolute, immunity of intergovernmental
organizations. But according to pleadings in several recent actions challeng-
ing the immunity of intergovernmental organizations headquartered in
Washington, that is precisely the effect FSIA has had.
The most prominent of these cases, Broadbent v. Organization of Ameri-
can States,36 is currently on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. The appellants are seven former staff members of the Organization
of American States (OAS) whose employment was terminated due to a
general reduction in force. In November 1977, they filed an action in federal
district court alleging breach of contract and seeking compensation and
damages of several hundred thousand dollars each, plus interest, attorneys
fees and costs. To catch the flavor of the litigation, though, is to go back to
1976, when twelve of those dismissed by the OAS filed suit in federal district
court, then withdrew that suit and refiled in the District of Columbia's
Superior Court, alleging civil conspiracy, libel and slander, claiming some
$60 million in damages. Their suit was dismissed in June 1977 on the
merits.3 7 But the judge declined to rule on the immunity from suit of the two
"59 Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. No. 993 (1945).
"Doc. 933, IV/2/42 (2), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 705 (1945).
"28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. (1976).
"No. 77-1974, appeal docketed, No. 77-1465 (D.C. Cir. May 25, 1978).
"[12 ex-staff members of OAS] v. Secretary-General of OAS, No. 76-2348 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
withdrawn and later refiled, (Superior Court, D.C. 1977).
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named defendants (the Organization's Secretary-General and Director of
Public Information), thereby allowing the inference that no such immunity
obtains.
While this action was pending, the OAS asked the State Department to
suggest the two officials' immunity. But State would only go so far as to
certify that the two were entitled to the immunities conferred by Section
7(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA).38
The International Organizations Immunities Act was enacted in 1945 to fill
a void then thought to exist in United States law, namely, that there ap-
peared to be no statutory authority whereby the United States could extend
privileges and immunity to intergovernmental organizations and their offi-
cials.3 9 In essence, IOIA resolved that perceived deficiency by simply plac-
ing such organizations on an equal footing with sovereign states, a useful
enough analogy at the time, despite the conceptual differences between the
two, because sovereign states then enjoyed absolute immunity. It was only
later, with the advent of state trading and other commercial initiatives by
states, that a restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity emerged which
renders these differences critical. The restrictive doctrine distinguishes be-
tween governmental acts (acts iure imperi) and commercial acts (acts iure
gestionis) such that, in general, a state while engaged in the latter is not
entitled to the immunity it enjoys while engaged in the former. The distinc-
tion, in other words, reaffirms the original rationale of sovereign immunity,
which is that it is in consequence of the absolute independence of every
sovereign authority that every other sovereign is obliged to respect its inde-
pendence and dignity. 0 What the restrictive doctrine adds as a corollary is
that this obligation does not warrant according states acting as commercial
entities a competitive advantage over private commercial entities. All this
has little to do with intergovernmental organizations, which are not sover-
eign and do not enjoy the qualities statehood and sovereignty afford which
underlie the logic of sovereign immunity. But when Congress enacted FSIA,
it made no mention of intergovernmental organizations and neglected to
account for the fact that thirty-one years earlier it had placed them on an
equal footing with sovereign states." Therein lies the rub.
After the OAS employees' Superior Court suit was dismissed, the OAS
drew the State Department's attention both to the court's refusal to decide
1122 U.S.C. § 288 et seq. (1945).
"See H.R. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1945).
"See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (6th ed. 1963).
'What IOIA says, in pertinent part, is this:
International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located, and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations
may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of
any contract.
22 U.S.C. § 288a(b).
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the question and to an order signed by Chief Judge William B. Bryant of the
federal district court, in an otherwise unrelated action, which stated that the
OAS enjoys only restrictive immunity which does not extend to "commer-
cial activities." 2 In a letter dated March 24, 1977, the State Department's
Counselor on International Law refused the Secretary-General's request for
a suggestion of immunity, indicating that no such suggestion had been filed
in international organization cases since 1960, and that FSIA made any
revival of the custom inappropriate. Further entreaties were similarly re-
jected.
Then in November seven of the twelve former OAS employees filed a new
complaint against the OAS and its General Secretariat, that is, the Broad-
bent case. In addition to denying the substance of the charges, 3 the defen-
dants moved to quash service of process and to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that the court lacked both in personam and subject matter jurisdic-
tion and that they were absolutely immune from service of process by virtue
of the OAS's status as an intergovernmental organization and pursuant to
IOIA. On January 25, 1978 District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., issued
an order denying their motion," holding that the express language of the
IOIA and the statutory purposes underlying it bring intergovernmental or-
ganizations within the terms of FSIA and that, therefore, under FSIA the
court has jurisdiction over both the parties and the controversy. Defen-
dants, he added, enjoy restricted, not absolute, immunity and the employ-
ment contracts which are the subject matter of the litigation constitute
"commercial activity" not entitled to immunity under the restrictive doc-
trine as codified in FSIA."5
Defendants thereupon moved for certification under 28 U.S.C. Section
1291(b) to take an interlocutory appeal and to stay the proceedings pending
appeal, a motion supported, with leave of the court, by the United Nations,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Pan-American Health Organization,
'2Judge Bryant's order, dated May 31, 1977, was issued in Dupree Associates, Inc. v.
Organization of American States, No. 76-2335 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 1977), which alleged breach
of contract in connection with services performed in developing a lot for the OAS's new
headquarters building. In Dupree, the State Department's Deputy Legal Adviser for Manage-
ment told the court that "whether immunity exists under [IOIA] in a given case is a question of
law." The court's attention was drawn to the March 20, 1975 agreement between the United
States and the OAS relating to privileges and immunities of representatives to and staff of the
OAS. Agreement Respecting Privileges and Immunities, March 20, 1975, United States-
Organization of American States, [19751 26 U.S.T. 1025, T.I.A.S. No. 8089.
"In addition to breach of contract, the suit charged defendants with failure to abide by a
decision of the OAS's Administrative Tribunal ordering them to reinstate plaintiffs or pay
them damages.
"No. 77-1974 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 1978) (order denying motion to quash service of process
and dismiss the complaint).
"d. slip op. at 2. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint alleging jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship and deleting their earlier allegation of jurisdiction based on
FSIA and IOIA.
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as amici. The UN's brief, which Judge Robinson appears to have found
especially persuasive, contended that the court had
failed to distinguish between the sovereign immunity of States and the functional
immunity of international organizations in international law and appears to have
taken no account of the treaty obligations of the United States flowing from
Article 139 of the Charter of the Organization of American States . . . . which
provides that the Organization "shall enjoy in the territory of each Member such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
accomplishment of its purposes." 6
The purpose of such extensive immunity, the UN's brief continued, is to
prevent a court of any of the member states from interfering in any way
with the functioning of the organization, "which is-like a federal govern-
ment with respect to its constituent states-a joint enterprise of all mem-
bers." 47 Its administrative decisions are taken by or under the authority of
its political organs, in which each member state has a vote as prescribed by
the organization's constitutive treaty.
[T~o permit any member State unilaterally to alter a decision so reached by
subjecting it to judicial review in its own courts would naturally be considered
intolerable by the other member States; furthermore, if any one member may
intervene judicially in the affairs of the organization, there is nothing that would
preclude all other members from doing so too, thus subjecting it to the consider-
able burden of litigating in various countries and to a multiplicity of possibly
inconsistent legal systems and decisions."
Moreover, it concluded, a holding that American courts have jurisdiction to
consider the merits of disputes between international organizations and
their staff would destroy the possibility of creating a truly international civil
service, "which has always been considered to be one of the prerequisites
for the successful functioning of any international organization that is to
serve all its members impartially."
49
In an order and memorandum dated March 28, 1978,50 Judge Robinson
vacated his order of January 25, saying that upon careful review of its
decision, the court had found that "it did not properly weight the fact that
international organizations . . . are creatures of treaty and by virtue of
treaty stand in a different position with respect to the issue of immunity
than sovereign nations."" He then added this:
The Court is persuaded that international organizations are immune from every
form of legal process except insofar as that immunity is expressly waived by treaty
or expressly limited by statute. This Court is further persuaded that this Court has
"Memorandum, amicus curiae, of the United Nations in Support of Defendants' Motion for





"Id. Broadbent, Slip op. at 2.
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jurisdiction over lawsuits involving international organizations only insofar as
such jurisdiction is expressly provided for by statute. 2
Neither FSIA nor IOIA, in Judge Robinson's view, provides for such juris-
diction.
When a statute appears on its face to be inconsistent with a treaty obliga-
tion, or when a statute incorporates an earlier statute or parts of it without
considering the full extent of the impact such incorporation may have,
courts are likely to bail out the legislature by reference to some canon of
interpretation which enables them to conclude that what they wished the
legislature had done, it had in fact done. But Judge Robinson used no such
legal fiction. Nor, on the other hand, did he say in so many words that IOIA
is inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations or general principles of interna-
tional law. But it certainly appears to be and that is almost certain to be a
point of contention on appeal.
The appeal matches appellants, together with the Justice Department, as
amicus, against appellees and the United Nations and World Bank as amici.
For international lawyers, the most interesting contrast is between the briefs
of the Government and the United Nations. The Government's brief, in
fact, seems virtually certain to raise eyebrows in the international legal
community, if only because of its almost casual concern for international
law."
Its argument is relatively simple. It contends that IOIA places the immu-
nity of intergovernmental organizations on a par with that of sovereign
states; that by virtue of FSIA foreign states are not entitled to immunity
from suit in respect of their commercial activities; but that this suit should
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the legislative
history of FSIA evinces an intention not to include a foreign state's (and
therefore an intergovernmental organization's) administration of its civil
service within the scope of its commercial activities exception. In other
words, the Government says IOIA is controlling, FSIA is explanatory of its
present reach, and the legislative history of FSIA shows that the narrow
range of organizational behavior this case involves was meant to be kept
immune from attack in American courts.
The brief is almost silent in respect of appellees' contention that the issue
is settled by the terms of the OAS treaty itself, i.e., the "necessary" privi-
leges and immunities clause, as interpreted in international law and the
practice of states. Nor does it directly gainsay Judge Robinson's somewhat
elliptic conclusion to the same effect.5 " Instead, the relevance of the treaty's
"Id.
"The Government brief is signed by an Assistant Attorney General, a U.S. Attorney and
three Justice Department attorneys. No State Department lawyers are mentioned as participa-
ting in the preparation of the brief.
"Only in the context of discussing why the employment of civil servants is not a commercial
activity under FSIA does the government brief concede the effect which an attempt by a court
of a member state to adjudicate personnel claims would have on an intergovernmental
organization's independence.
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immunities clause is reduced to an unattended observation that the clause
does not pertain to commercial activities. No mention is made, accordingly,
of any inconsistency between IOIA-FSIA and the treaty commitment. In
fact, international law itself appears in the Government brief to have a
bearing on the case only insofar as it justifies the proposition that the
employee relations of an intergovernmental organization "[are] rarely in
complete harmony with the municipal laws of the member states comprising
[it].''5
The UN's brief is cut from a different cloth. Arguing that the absolute
immunity of intergovernmental organizations has been understood by
member states since before IOIA was drafted, it undertakes an extensive
review of the drafting history of the constitutive instruments of postwar
organizations, the conceptual differences between the two types of immu-
nity, and the decisions of foreign courts dealing with the question and
analogous ones. As a fallback position it agrees with the Government's
interpretation of FSIA's exclusion of employee relations from the definition
of "commercial activities." But the bulk of its argument is spent in estab-
lishing the nature of the treaty commitment the United States and other
member states have undertaken to accord intergovernmental organizations
immunity from national interference.
A decision by the court is expected sometime this summer.
Expropriation Award. On December 8, 1978, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia confirmed the award made in arbitration proceed-
ings between Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), 6 growing out of actions taken by the
Jamaican government affecting Revere's Jamaican subsidiary.
Revere's subsidiary operated a bauxite and alumina processing complex
in Jamaica. In 1970, Revere obtained expropriation insurance from OPIC,
a United States Government-owned corporation, to protect its investment
in Jamaica against political risk. The insurance contract provided that all
disputes between OPIC and Revere were to be resolved by arbitration and
that the arbitration award would be "final and binding upon the parties."
After the subsidiary shut down its operations in August 1975, Revere filed a
"For this observation the sole citation is to M. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOY-
MENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 12 (1967). There is absolutely no reference to four
International Court of Justice advisory opinions which, at very least, bear on the question of
how the international legal community treats the staff relations of intergovernmental organiza-
tions, namely: Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal, [19731 I.C.J. 166; Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization Upon Complaints Made Against UNESCO, 11956] I.C.J. 77; Effect
of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 119541
I.C.J. 47; and, of course, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, [19491 I.C.J. 174.
'Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp. No. 16-10-0137-76
(1976), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1321 (1978). A summary appeared in Trends, 13
INT'L LAW. 173 (1979).
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claim with OPIC alleging that the Jamaican government had taken certain
actions-principally the imposition of a tax in June 1974-which consti-
tuted "expropriation" within the meaning of the insurance contract. OPIC
denied Revere's claim and initiated arbitration under the auspices of the
American Arbitration Association. Although one of the three neutral arbi-
trators felt that OPIC was not obligated to Revere, the majority found it
was, but to the tune of only $1,131,144 rather than the $64,131,000 claimed
by Revere.
Revere thereupon filed a motion with the district court to correct the
award, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 11 (1976), and to vacate it, pursuant to
9 U.S.C. Section 10 (1976), arguing that the majority of the arbitrators
exceeded their powers by:
1. making three adjustments which disregarded express terms of the in-
surance contract;
2. writing into the contract a term it does not contain;
3. giving to that term a meaning which it does not have; and
4. choosing a construction of the contract most favorable to the insurer
and least favorable to the insured.
All this, said Revere, resulted in the writing down of the amount of Revere's
equity investment, the amount recoverable under the contract.
The district court found its scope of review of an arbitral award extremely
limited under case law, quoting language from recent D.C. Circuit cases to
the effect that an arbitral award will not be vacated, even though the arbi-
trator may have made errors of fact and law, unless it "compels the viola-
tion of law or conduct contrary to accepted public policy."" That the
arbitrators here may have misconstrued the contract is not open to judicial
review, the court said, nor would their failure to apply the rule of contra
proferentem to this insurance contract, if indeed they had so failed, violate
public policy so as to justify the court in vacating the award. In fact, Revere
"failed to convince the Court that any error has occurred, and certainly the
Court can find no error of the magnitude required" " by case law to set
aside the award. "Public policy is involved in this case," the court contin-
ued, "but not in the manner the petitioner contends. There is a strong
public policy behind judicial enforcement of binding arbitration clauses.""
Congress and the treaty power. The 95th Congress took several un-
heralded actions which may resolve, at least for the time being, the impasse
between Congress and the executive branch over their respective preroga-
tives in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements.
"Union Employers Division v. Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 353 F. Supp. 1348,
1349 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd 492 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp., No. 78-0296, slip op. at
3 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 1978).
"Id.
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On its face, the International Consultation Resolution6" merely expresses
the sense of the Senate that in determining whether a particular interna-
tional agreement should be submitted to it as a treaty, "the President shall
have the timely advice of the [Senate's] Committee on Foreign Relations
through agreed procedures established with the Secretary of State."'" Sena-
tor Clark, one of the resolution's co-sponsors, had originally sought ap-
proval of a measure which would have authorized the Senate to reverse any
executive branch determination that a particular international undertaking
constitutes an "executive agreement" rather than a "treaty." Failing that,
Senator Clark sought legislation which would bar funding whenever the
executive branch failed to consult with the Senate in determining the consti-
tutional status of an international agreement entered into in behalf of the
United States.
S. Res. 536, instead, deals with the Senate's related concern that its
"advice" and "consent" powers not be construed as one; in other words,
that its advice be sought and heeded early in the treaty negotiation process
rather than at the time its consent is sought to ratification. To satisfy the
Senate on this point, the State Department offered to send the Senate's
Foreign Relations Committee periodically, on a confidential basis, a list of
significant international agreements which have been authorized for nego-
tiation pursuant to the Department's Circular 175 procedure.62 The list
would describe the subject matter of the proposed agreements and indicate
their anticipated form. The Committee would then advise the State Depart-
ment of any listed agreement as to which it wishes to consult and consulta-
tion would follow. The Committee decided to accept this procedure and
that, it appears, is how the innocuous-sounding S. Res. 536 came to be
adopted.63
The State Department's reference to its Circular 175 procedure raised the
question of whether consultation would take place with respect to agree-
ments to be negotiated by departments and agencies other than the State
Department. Surprising as it may seem, the State Department is not always
told by other executive departments and agencies that they are negotiating,
or indeed have already concluded, an international agreement. Because
these agreements are not normally of great significance and would therefore
probably constitute "executive agreements" under the traditional distinc-
tion between "treaties" and "executive agreements," they are not subject
to the consent of the Senate. Nor, when their existence is unknown to the
60S. Res. 536, 95th Cong. (1978).
"Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
"
2See I I FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 700 et seq. (1974). and Murphy, Treaties and Interna-
tional Agreements Other Than Treaties: Constitutional Allocation of Power and Responsibil-
ity Among the President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, 23 KANSAS L. REV.
221, 223 (1975).
3A similar offer was extended by the State Department to the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations and accepted by that Committee early in October 1978.
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State Department, does the Congress learn of them through the reporting
procedure for executive agreements established by the Case Act. 6
The Case Act,6" enacted by Congress in 1972 and named for its chief
sponsor, then Senator Clifford Case, requires the Secretary of State to
transmit to Congress the text of any international agreement other than a
treaty to which the United States has become a party, and to do so within
sixty days of its entering into force. The purpose of the Case Act was to
assure Congress that it is fully informed, on a timely basis, of internation-
ally binding agreements entered into on behalf of the United States.66 To the
extent that Congress is not so informed because the Secretary of State
himself does not know of certain agreements, the Case Act's reporting
system does not achieve -its purpose. Ironically, the more diligent the Secre-
tary of State is in seeking to identify international agreements made by
other departments and agencies, the less likely he will be able to meet the
sixty-day reporting deadline. Late reporting, in fact, has been an almost
constant feature of the operation of the Case Act in practice.
To tighten the Case Act, and incidentally to give the State Department
greater control over the negotiation of international agreements binding on
the United States, the Congress enacted several amendments to the Case Act
on October 7, 1978.67 The first of these adds to the definition of those
"international agreements" which must be reported within sixty days "any
oral international agreement, which shall be reduced to writing." ' 68 The
second requires the President to submit an annual report to the Speaker of
the House and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
with respect to each international agreement which, during the preceding
"A striking example of such an agreement, if it proves to have been such, was one which
came to light a few weeks ago during the trial in Washington of three Cuban exiles charged
with helping in the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean diplomat who was
killed by a car bomb in Washington in September 1976. According to an account of the trial
which appeared in The New York Times on March 8, 1979, at A3, an agreement was entered
into on April 7, 1978 by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and the
Chilean Under Secretary of the Interior which resulted in the extradition, the following day, of
Michael Vernon Townley, an American electronics expert then in Chile who has admitted
planting the car bomb. Mr. Townley claims that he was acting as an agent of DINA, the
Chilean secret police. In order to get Chile to extradite Mr. Townley, the United States
Attorney apparently agreed to restrict the information it would make available to the world
about its investigation into the murder. According to The New York Times the restricted
information concerns other DINA assassination plots.
The United States Attorney's authority to enter into such an agreement would have to come
either from an existing judicial assistance treaty, an interagency agreement or-at least accord-
ing to the view long held by the executive branch-under a delegation of the President's general
executive powers. The United States has no judicial assistance treaty with Chile.
611 U.S.C. § 112b (1972).
"That a particular undertaking is regarded as an "executive agreement" rather than a
"treaty" for the purposes of United States constitutional law, does not, without more, detract
from its juridical status as an international agreement under international law.
"'Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-426, §708, 92 Stat. 963 (amending I U.S.C. § 1126
(1972))
"Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 70 (1), (2), now incorporated at I U.S.C. § 112b(a).
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year, was transmitted to the Congress after the expiration of the sixty-day
reporting period, "describing fully and completely the reasons for the late
transmittal." '69 Neither of these changes affects the "national security"
exception in the Act which provides that transmission of any agreement
believed by the President to endanger national security will be restricted to
the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees
rather than being released to the full Congress.
Perhaps most importantly, the new amendments add a section to the Case
Act which provides that no international agreement may be signed or other-
wise concluded in behalf of the United States without prior consultation
with the Secretary of State (although "consultation" may encompass a class
of agreements rather than a particular agreement)."0 And it directs the
President, through the Secretary of State to promulgate rules and regula-
tions to carry out this new arrangement."
The procedural agreement which led to S. Res. 536 and the October 1978
amendments are likely to assure Congress a greater role in the agreement-
making process, relative to the executive branch, and to assure the State
Department a greater role in coordinating the process, relative to the rest of
the executive branch.
UNESCO Declaration on News Media. The General Conference of the
146-member United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO), meeting in Paris for its twentieth session from October 24
to November 28, 1978, adopted by acclamation the text of a Declaration of
Fundamental Principles concerning the contribution of the mass media
(i.e., the press) to strengthening peace and international understanding. 2
A draft of the Declaration introduced two years ago had drawn fire from
western governments and representatives of press organizations for its ap-
parent endorsement of government control of news reporting. The final
version, though still criticized in some press circles because it appears to
accept the premise that UNESCO has a right to prescribe to the media,' 3 is a
far cry from the earlier version. It still alludes to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966
which, because it holds that the "right to freedom of expression ... carries
with it special duties and responsibilities," strikes some observers as open-
ing the door to official control over news organizations. But the carefully
worded compromise text refers only to certain "principles proclaimed" in
the Covenant, a nice distinction which might be overlooked in practice by
authoritarian governments seeking to rationalize their control of the media.
"Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 708(3), now incorporated at I U.S.C. § 112b(b).
"Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 708(3), now incorporated at I U.S.C. § 112b(c).
'Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 708(3), now incorporated at I U.S.C. § 12b(e).
"The full text of the UNESCO Declaration, in English, is set forth in the U.N. Monthly
Chronicle, Dec. 1978, at 54-55.
"See UNESCO draws press flak, The Inter Dependent, Jan. 1979, at 5. The newspaper is a
monthly publication of the United Nations Association of the United States.
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Read in its entirety, however, the text appears to represent a balance
between the ideal of freedom of the press and the special concerns of
developing countries for greater control over the elements which appear to
them to be retarding their development. Article 11(2) states, for example,
that
Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the
sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to
check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To that end,journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access
to information...
Similarly, Article 11(4) provides:
If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this
Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of
the mass media, in their own country and abroad, be assured of protection
guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.
On the other hand, Article I of the UNESCO Declaration might strike
some observers as tying freedom of the press to the "promotion of human
rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war,"-
words and phrases which are unobjectionable out of context, but which, in
the parlance of the United Nations are often uttered with anti-Western
inflections.
Other provisions of the Declaration containing reminders about the pur-
poses of a free press, whether or not intended by some states as admonitions
to western press services in their reporting on the events in Third World
countries, are on their own terms not at all unreasonable. For example,
Article 11(3) reminds the press of the need to give expression to "peoples
• . . who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territo-
ries." And Article 111(2), which seems tied to demands for a new interna-
tional economic order, speaks of the contribution the press makes by
"draw[ing] attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as
poverty, malnutrition and diseases .
Transnational organizations-IA TA. From the time of its formation af-
ter World War II until about two years ago, the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) set agreed-on fares, region by region, for international
air transport. But its power to do so diminished sharply in 1977 when the
United States Government withheld its approval of new fares by IATA to
compete with Laker Airways' standby offers on the North Atlantic run.
Instead, the United States approved a set of discounts outside the IATA
framework, engendering a period of competitive pricing, including deep
discount fares, which for the short run, at least, has reduced the cost to
consumers of international air transportation.
The International Air Transport Association's 106 airline members voted
at its annual meeting in Geneva last November to reorganize the associa-
tion. The reorganization plan, which is subject to approval by member
governments, would establish a two-tier system that would allow airlines to
withdraw from IATA's fare-setting activities while continuing to participate
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in its technical activities. These include agreeing to cover interchange of
baggage, minimizing of red tape at borders and standardizing of ticketing to
permit travel with one transaction over a long, multiairline itinerary.
In a speech delivered at a symposium on air policy in Kingston, Jamaica,
in January of this year, IATA's Director-General, Knut Hammarskjold,
expressed concern "that the manner in which [American-backed innova-
tions] are being collectively implemented may undermine the principles of
negotiations which have held the system together." 7 He is concerned "that
in the process of seeking its new objectives, the United States may be
threatening to destroy multilateral mechanisms which have coordinated in-
ternational operations to the enormous benefit of consumers." 75
Practice of law in Europe. A directive issued by the Council of the Euro-
pean Economic Community 6 (EEC) on March 22, 1977, effective March 1,
1979, requires EEC member states to remove national barriers to the prac-
tice of law insofar as they apply to lawyers certified to practice by other
member states.77
The directive grows out of a ruling of the European Court of Justice" in
1974 in a case brought by a Dutch lawyer, Jean Reyners. Though born,
raised and educated in Belgium, M. Reyners had retained his Dutch parents'
nationality and thereby was rendered ineligible to register with the Belgian
bar, a precondition to practicing law in Belgium. His having received a
Belgian law degree (docteur en droit) helped him not a whit. All of this
struck M. Reyners as inconsistent with the Rome Treaty's right-of-
establishment provisions, provisions which are designed to assure freedom
of movement within the Common Market for nationals of member states.
But the Belgian bar association argued that lawyers exercise official author-
ity and as such are exempt from the treaty's right-of-establishment provi-
sions.
The ECJ agreed with Reyners, reasoning that although lawyers' activities
may be compelled by the state and constitute a legal monopoly, lawyers
themselves act with impartiality and independence and their work does not
involve the exercise of official authority. 9
The directive does not completely eliminate restrictions on interstate
practice. Member states may draw up regulations to assure proper identifi-
"N.Y. Times, Feb.1, 1979, at D6.
131d.
"The fifty-eight member Council is one of four institutions created by the Treaty of Rome
which established the Common Market (EEC) in 1957. The EEC, in effect, has a dual execu-
tive: the Commission, which proposes and supervises the execution of laws and policies; and
the Council, which enacts laws and programs, based on Commission proposals. In practice,
the Council is the EEC's main decision-making body.
"20 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 78)17(1977).
"The Court of Justice, the EEC's high court, consists of one judge from each member state.
Its decisions are final and cannot be appealed in national courts.
"The case and its aftermath are discussed in Brewer, National Barriers Bending for Europe's
Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1I, 1978, at 21.
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cation, for example. And certain amenities may be retained, such as the
necessity for the visiting trial lawyer to be introduced to the presiding judge
or even the president of the local bar.8" The directive also anticipates that
member states will require the participation as co-counsel of members of
their own bar, the idea being to assure familiarity, and compliance, with
local procedural rules.
But the directive does mark a trend in the Common Market towards the
emergence of a truly supranational law, a treaty-based constitutional law
whose impact on the national legal system of member states is becoming
more pronounced.
'
0Last October, the bar associations of the member states agreed on a common identity
document. 24 BULL LEGAL DEvs. 266 (biweekly ed. Dec. 15, 1978). The Bulletin, published
biweekly by The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, gives capsule summa-
ries of legal developments throughout the world.
